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Buyer’s waiver of a special condition 
 
 
A recent decision of the Queensland Supreme Court (McMurdo J) raises 
matters of interest for practitioners undertaking conveyancing.  Woodward v 
Nagel [2003] QSC 100 was delivered on 11 April 2003. 
 
Facts 
 
A contract for the purchase of a house and land provided for a settlement date 
of 24 April 2003.  A relatively common form of special condition provided that 
the contract was conditional upon completion of the sale of the buyer’s house 
on or before 26 March 2003.  If the condition was not satisfied (without default 
by the buyer) the contract was to be at an end and all deposit money 
refunded. 
 
On the 26th March the seller’s solicitors sent the following fax: 
 
“We note that special condition 1 of the contract was due to be satisfied today.  
Please provide your urgent advices with respect to the sale of your clients’ 
property.” 
 
On the 27th March 2003, the buyer’s solicitors responded in these terms 
(which were to prove critical): 
 
“We refer to your fax dated 26 March 2003.  Our clients’ sale has been 
extended to 24 April to coincide with the completion of this matter.” (italics 
added) 
 
In response to this fax, the seller’s solicitors purported to terminate the 
contract on the basis that the special condition had not been satisfied by the 
due date and no extension of this date had been either sought or agreed. 
 
The rights of the parties 
 
Buyer 
 
It was common ground that the special condition was for the benefit of the 
buyer.  On this basis the buyer was entitled to waive the special condition at 
least up until the 26th March and arguably at any time prior to termination by 
the vendor (for non-fulfilment of the condition). 
 
Seller 
 
If the special condition had not been fulfilled by 26 March, the condition then 
became one for the benefit of both parties as the seller has an interest in 
knowing for how long its liability was to remain unresolved (per Windeyer J in 
Gange v Sullivan (1966) 116 CLR 418).  Accordingly, the seller would be 
within its right to terminate the contract for non-fulfilment of the special 
condition by the due date unless there had been a prior waiver of the special 
condition by buyer. 
 
Judgment 
 
The sole issue for determination by McMurdo J was whether the fax of 27th 
March 2003 constituted a waiver (by the buyer) of the benefit of the special 
condition. 
 
Waiver applies only where there are alternative rights inconsistent with one 
another and a party acts, with knowledge of the facts giving rise to the law 
applicable to the rights, in a manner consistent only with that party having 
chosen to rely on one of them (MP Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven 
[2002] QSC 320, [45]).  Was the fax only consistent with the buyer intending 
to complete and forgoing its right to rely on the special condition to terminate if 
its own sale did not eventuate? 
 
Whilst the fax made it plain that the special condition had not been satisfied 
by the due date, the fax did not expressly say that the buyer was waiving the 
benefit of the special condition.  Notwithstanding that there was no express 
statement of waiver, McMurdo J treated the reference to ‘the completion of 
this matter’ as an unequivocal statement that the buyer intended to complete.  
Justice McMurdo determined that this statement, coupled with the statement 
that the special condition had not been fulfilled, constituted an effective waiver 
of the special condition. 
 
For the vendor it was submitted that the fax, rather than constituting a waiver, 
was a purported unilateral variation of the contract, extending the date for the 
satisfaction of the special condition from the 26 March until the 24th April.  This 
submission was rejected.  Whilst the buyer could waive the benefit of the 
special condition, the buyer had no entitlement to unilaterally vary the special 
condition.  On this basis McMurdo J considered it was appropriate to construe 
the words used in the fax by attributing to the buyer an intention to act 
consistently with the buyer’s entitlements under the contract. 
 
As Justice McMurdo concluded that the fax was an effective waiver, the 
seller’s purported termination was not effective.  In the result, the contract was 
enforceable against the seller. 
 
Comment 
 
This decision raises issues of interest for the legal representatives of both 
buyers and sellers. 
 
It would be interesting to speculate, when the fax of 27 March was sent, 
whether it was the buyer’s intention to waive the benefit of the special 
condition by making reference to ‘the completion of the matter’.  Ideally, to 
communicate waiver of a special condition, express language to that effect 
should be utilised rather than alleging waiver by necessary inference from the 
language used.  Conversely, if what was being sought was a mere extension 
of the date for fulfilment of the special condition, a clear request in these 
terms would have clarified the situation. 
 
Two hypothetical situations, based on the same factual premise, may help to 
demonstrate these propositions. 
 
Hypothetical One 
 
In hypothetical one, assume the seller’s response to the fax of 27 March had 
been to inquire if the buyer was waiving the right to rely on the special 
condition to terminate if their own sale fell through.  What might the response 
have been?  It is speculation, but only an intrepid buyer would usually waive 
their right in these circumstances.  Of course, if the buyer did choose to waive 
their right at that time the position is made clear for all concerned.  However, a 
response that would be far more commonly encountered would be for the 
buyer to seek an extension of the date for satisfaction (or otherwise) of the 
special condition.  Faced with a request for an extension, the seller would be 
quite entitled to deny the extension, if they so desired.  If the special condition 
was not satisfied by the due date, and the date not extended, the seller could 
then terminate the contract (in the absence of waiver by the buyer).  In the 
reported decision, the right to terminate was, it seems, the result desired by 
the seller but denied due to the buyer’s earlier waiver. 
 
Hypothetical Two 
 
In hypothetical two, assume that the seller’s solicitors (without further inquiry) 
treated the fax of 27 March as constituting a waiver of the buyer’s rights under 
the special condition.  In this hypothetical situation the seller would then 
prepare for settlement.  Unlike the reported decision, what if the buyer was 
unable to sell their own home by the due date for settlement (24 April) and the 
buyer then purported to terminate the contract for non-satisfaction of the 
special condition? 
 
The risk for the seller in adopting this course of action (apart from the need to 
resort to litigation to determine the dispute) is that the buyer’s fax of 27 March 
may be construed as being equivocal in its terms.  The risk arises because 
the buyer has not indicated waiver in express terms.  The language employed 
could mean the buyer would be in a position to complete, provided the sale of 
the buyer’s own home occurred by the 24th of April.  In effect, the fax of 27 
March could be viewed (rather than as an attempt to unilaterally vary the 
contract) as merely a form of request for an extension of the special condition 
date, although not expressly articulated in this form.  If this argument were 
sustained, the requirements of waiver would not be satisfied and the buyer 
would be entitled to terminate the contract for non-fulfilment of the special 
condition. 
 
These hypothetical examples demonstrate the desirability of using precise 
language in conveyancing correspondence and the need to seek clarification 
where precise language is not employed. 
 
From the buyer’s perspective, if waiver were intended, the matter would have 
been put beyond doubt if the fax of 27 March simply said: 
 
“Our client waives its rights under special condition 1 of the contract.” 
 
From the seller’s perspective, both hypothetical examples demonstrate the 
advantage of seeking clarification if there is any concern that correspondence 
may be equivocal in its meaning.  By simply asking if the benefit of a special 
condition is being waived, or alternatively, if an extension is being sought, the 
position is clarified and risks averted. 
 
The decision serves as a timely reminder of the prudence that needs to be 
exercised in standard conveyancing transactions. 
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